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Thirty-three years ago, President Jimmy Carter signed, on behalf of the United 
States, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Drafted in the late 1970s to “address 
long-standing and pervasive inequities against women worldwide,” CEDAW is 
one of several human rights treaties created by the United Nations after World 
War II and specifically “sets out a comprehensive definition of discrimination, as 
well as a framework for improving women’s lives and measuring nations’ 
progress toward” the treaty’s stated goals (Wakefield 2010, 22). On the surface, 
the United States champions human rights throughout the world, but in practice 
the United States remains one of only seven countries worldwide to have not 
ratified CEDAW.
1
 In fact, the United States is “the only established industrialized 
democracy in the world that has not yet ratified” the Convention (Office of High 
Commissioner 2012; Koh 2002, 265).
2
  
This paper analyzes the fundamental question of the why the United States 
Senate has not, to date, provided its advice and consent to ratification for 
CEDAW. To provide an answer, this paper proceeds first with a brief discussion 
of the treaty ratification process in the United States and the stated goals of 
CEDAW. The paper then moves to an analysis of some of the key players in the 
ratification debate and the arguments made on both sides of that process. In 
particular, this analysis seeks to discover the specific reasons and conditions that 
have prevented the Senate from ratifying CEDAW thus far and considers what 
these factors, either by opposition or facilitation, say about the treaty ratification 
process in the United States.  
Studying the Senate’s actions with regard to CEDAW is particularly 
relevant because human rights issues, especially women’s rights, are prevalent in 
politics and the media today. Furthermore, the importance of CEDAW, both from 
a domestic and international standpoint, stems from its unique nature as a 
worldwide bill of rights that sets up standards for the nondiscriminatory treatment 
of women and provides “a framework from which any country can build 
programs that can save women’s lives and bring women into the economic 
mainstream of development” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 23). 
The protections guaranteed by this treaty became increasingly important to 
different groups within the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan where the Taliban continues to 
                                                          
1
 The other states to have not ratified CEDAW are Iran, Palau, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and 
Tonga. It is also interesting to note that of the states that have not ratified CEDAW, only the 
United States and Palau have actually signed the treaty (Office of High Commissioner 2012). 
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 The United States is also one of only six member states of the United Nations that has not yet 
ratified the treaty (Wakefield 2010, 22). 
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perpetrate terrible gender-specific acts against women
3
 (Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations 2002, 23). Since 2009, President Obama and his administration 
have consistently supported ratification of CEDAW and signaled their intention to 
secure United States accession to the treaty. 
   
Treaty Ratification in the United States 
Understanding the treaty ratification process within the United States begins with 
the Constitution, which states that the President “shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties” (United States 
Constitution 1787). Thus, Senate advice and consent does not constitute 
ratification, but a treaty cannot be ratified without first obtaining Senate advice 
and consent. The ratification process itself formally begins when the President 
signs a treaty and submits it to the Senate where it is automatically referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations (CFR) for consideration (Auerswald and 
Maltzman 2003, 1099). The CFR can choose whether to take any action on the 
treaty; however, the treaty will remain in the CFR until the Chairman schedules a 
vote to report it out to the full Senate for advice and consent. Only if a two-thirds 
majority of senators present and voting approve the treaty can the President ratify 
it on behalf of the United States (Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099).  
It is not uncommon, however, for the Senate to refuse to vote on a treaty 
that does not have enough support to ensure its approval, thus blocking the 
ratification of the treaty without using the Senate’s formal veto power 
(Congressional Research Service 2001, 3). These treaties often remain pending 
within the CFR for long periods of time, as has been the case with CEDAW 
(Congressional Research Service 2001, 3). In an era where multilateral treaties 
have become the norm rather than the exception, as a result of increasing 
globalization, it is important to understand how and why such treaties can face 
decades of obstruction in the United States Senate. 
 
What is CEDAW? 
As mentioned above, CEDAW is a human rights treaty created by the United 
Nations to end all forms of discrimination against women worldwide. In fact, 
“CEDAW is the only international human rights treaty that specifically focuses on 
the rights of women” (Blanchfield 2011, 1). Drafted in the late 1970s, this treaty 
incorporates features of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and 
has itself been described as “an international bill of rights for women” (Merry 
2006, 74). The thirty articles constituting the treaty cover a broad array of social 
issues that focus on three important areas greatly affecting women’s lives: 1) 
“civil rights and legal status in all areas of activity;” 2) healthcare with an 
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 Afghanistan ratified CEDAW in 2003.  
3 
 
emphasis on human reproduction, including “maternity, employment, family law, 
and health education;” and 3) “cultural factors including traditions, stereotypes, 
customs, and norms that perpetuate the discrimination of women in all areas of 
society” (Walter 2001, 17).  
More specifically, the Convention clearly defines the phrase 
“discrimination against women” as:  
 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field." (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 74). 
 
Many consider the treaty an innovation in women’s rights because CEDAW “has 
been credited with evolving the concept of substantive equality, a foil to the 
conventional model of formal equality,” thus recognizing that “women can be 
different from men but still equal to them” (Jain 2005, 93)
4
. This distinction is 
significant because CEDAW “does not deny that in most parts of the world today 
men and women play different roles in society. It reminds us, however, that the 
‘choice’ to play such roles may actually be determined by long-held cultural, 
religious, and other belief systems” (Ramdas 2011, 38). This is especially true in 
many non-Western states, particularly those that still implement discriminatory 
practices against women in violation of CEDAW, such as Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, 
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.  
Based on the reports given to the treaty’s regulatory organization from 
these five countries, the CEDAW monitoring Committee
5
 has noted the following 
problems. First, Iraq failed “to revoke legislative provisions that discriminate 
against women” and to curb “the violence against women perpetrated through 
honor killings” (CEDAW Committee 2000, 2-3). Second, Egypt failed “to address 
the root causes of [female] trafficking” and “violence against women in all its 
forms has increased, both in the private and public spheres” (CEDAW Committee 
2010, 5-6). Third, Yemen’s “traditional discriminatory practices and strong 
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 “The underlying basis of formal equality is that like should be treated alike – that those who are 
similarly situated be treated similarly. . . . Consequently, the argument would continue, that when 
groups are not similarly situated, they do not qualify for equality even if the differences among 
them are the product of historic or systemic discrimination” (Jain 2005, 93). 
5
 This regulatory body is designed to monitor state compliance with ratified treaties by requiring 
countries to write periodic reports detailing their efforts to enforce the treaty’s provisions (Merry 
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in their personal capacity (Parpart et al. 2002, 63). 
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stereotypical attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in 
family and society persist,” as does: 
 
The very low rate of representation of women in decision-making 
positions in all spheres, in particular in Parliament (0.3 per cent), the 
Government (1.82 per cent of commissioned ministers) and the judiciary 
(1.65 per cent), as well as in the public and private sectors, including in 
the public administration, the foreign service and academia (CEDAW 
Committee 2008, 3-5). 
 
Finally, Saudi Arabia prohibits women from voting in violation of the 
Convention’s Article 7 on political participation and Turkey has been cited “in 
numerous court cases regarding discrimination against women” (Blanchfield 
2011, 9-10). Therefore, the Convention permits States to recognize a difference 
between men and women that allows them to behave differently within society so 
long as those distinctions are not forced upon them and do not facilitate 
discrimination based on gender that is prohibited by the Convention as is the case 
in the examples above. 
 The United Nations General Assembly adopted CEDAW and opened it 
for signature in 1979 (Penn 2003, 7). By the beginning of September 1981, the 
treaty had received the required twenty ratifications to enter into force, at which 
point the treaty’s advisory committee became operational (Blanchfield 2011, 2; 
Penn 2003, 7). Unfortunately, like many committees monitoring other major 
United Nations treaties, the CEDAW Committee has limited power to compel 
states to comply with the treaty because it “cannot impose sanctions on 
noncompliant states” (Merry 2006, 72). Currently, the United States cannot 
participate in the CEDAW Committee because it has not ratified the treaty. After 
President Carter transmitted CEDAW to the Senate in November 1980, the CFR 
held hearings on the treaty in 1988, 1990, 1994, and 2002, but, to date, the treaty 
has not been considered for advice and consent to ratification by the full Senate 
(Blanchfield 2011, 1). Despite President Obama’s intentions otherwise
6
, the 
United States currently remains the only country in North America and Europe 
that is not a party to CEDAW (Blanchfield 2011, 1; Lockwood 2006, 235).  
 
Analysis of the United States Non-Ratification of CEDAW 
Looking at the path that CEDAW has taken through the Senate since 1980 reveals 
a number of overlapping factors that, together, have shaped this treaty’s 
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ratification process for better and for worse over the past three decades. This 
section focuses on the role played by interest groups and key senators, as well as 
the effect of executive-legislative relations on the ratification process, by 
analyzing the arguments made both for and against ratification from the treaty’s 
advocates and opponents. To begin, treaties receiving bipartisan support often 
face less obstruction during the ratification process and vice versa. CEDAW falls 
squarely into this trend because, despite receiving substantial support from 
Presidents Carter, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, the treaty lacks equal, 
and even sizeable, support from both Democratic and Republican Senators 
(Sommers 2011, 38; Ramdas 2011, 30). This type of political divide, in which 
most opposition comes from one party while most support comes from the other 
party, has been referred to as “cross-partisanship” rather than true 
“bipartisanship” because “the initiative comes from one party, which then seeks to 
gain enough support from the other to form a winning coalition” (Jones 2005, 30). 
In the case of CEDAW, advocates of ratification are primarily composed of 
Democrats who have thus far been unable to gather enough support from 
Republicans to guarantee a favorable two-thirds majority in the Senate.  
The detrimental effect of cross-partisanship on the ratification process is 
clearly linked to the Constitution’s mandate of a two-thirds Senate majority 
necessary for successful treaty ratification and thus helps explain why the United 
States has not ratified CEDAW over the past thirty years. In particular, the fact 
that Republicans held a majority of Senate seats between 1981 and 1987 could 
help explain why the CFR did not hold any hearings on CEDAW or report it to 
the floor for a vote during those years (Majority and Minority Leaders and Party 
Whips 2014). Similarly, even when Democrats held a Senate majority between 
1988 and 1994, treaty supporters lacked a supermajority that could overcome 
Republican opposition to the treaty during a vote (Majority and Minority Leaders 
and Party Whips 2014). Notably, the only four hearings held on CEDAW were 
conducted by the CFR during years where Democrats controlled a majority of 
Senate seats and thus selected which Senator would hold the influential position 
of Chairman in the CFR.  
Since President Carter’s signing of CEDAW, both Democrats and 
Republicans alike have supported the idea of CEDAW in theory, as part of the 
United States’ espoused western democratic ideals, but contention over the costs 
versus benefits of the treaty appear to split largely along partisan lines. As a 
result, arguments based on the content of the treaty and its implementation have 
resulted in procedural obstructions based on the actions of individual Senators 
opposed to the treaty. One of the biggest obstacles to CEDAW’s ratification has 
been the significant challenges posed by “the American right, led by the late 
Senator Jesse Helms and conservative organizations” (Ramdas 2011, 29). During 
his time as Chairman of the CFR (1995-2001), Helms singlehandedly blocked any 
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action taken on CEDAW by refusing to hold hearings on the treaty and thus 
stalling the ratification process (Sommers 2011, 38). Helms even instructed the 
capitol police to “escort women members of Congress out of a hearing, where 
they had come to ask him for a meeting to discuss CEDAW, admonishing them to 
‘act like ladies’” (Rabin 2000, 4). Only after Helms retired from his post as 
Chairman did the Senate resume consideration of the treaty. Although Helms is an 
extreme example, the type of obstruction that Helms illustrates is permitted 
according to Senate rules and could explain why the CFR did not consider 
CEDAW during periods where other Chairmen opposed the treaty.  
The power of a solitary CFR Chairman in shaping the ratification process 
also demonstrates one of the reasons why neither public opinion nor interest 
groups have a decisive effect on the success of a treaty. Specifically, CEDAW has 
received support from vocal women’s groups
7
 and “broad-based organizations 
such as the AARP, AFL-CIO, American Bar Association, and League of Women 
Voters,” but the grassroots campaigns of these groups and other non-
governmental supporters have not resulted in ratification of the treaty
8
 (Sommers 
2011, 38; CFR 2002, 9). Moreover, a nationwide poll taken in May 2010 found 
that “89 percent of respondents said that the United States should ratify the 
treaty,” but the CFR has not held any further hearings on the treaty (Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 10; Wakefield 2010). This lack of 
progress is largely due to the fact that the politics of internal Senate policy take 
precedence over external pressure from interest groups and public opinion. First, 
public opinion polls on specific issues “almost never measure relative intensities 
of opinion [and therefore] they fail to reveal whether the attitude is accompanied 
by sufficient emotional involvement to influence [Congressional] conduct in a 
significant way” (Dahl 1983, 38). Second, Senators tend to be insulated from both 
public opinion and interest group pressure, and even when such “outsider” forces 
penetrate Congress, Senators are more likely to listen to the voices and opinions 
with which they already agree. Additionally, it is difficult for Senators to change 
one another’s minds or even sway their colleagues’ votes, but it is even more 
challenging for “outsiders” to do so. As a result, the public debate over CEDAW 
may have given additional ammunition to the CFR’s refusal to push the treaty 
forward, but rather than creating the divide between treaty opponents and 
advocates, it has merely exacerbated the tensions contributing to the wide gap in 
opinions. 
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 i.e. the Church Women United, the United Methodist Women, and the National Organization for 
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Recent revitalized efforts by the Obama administration to ratify CEDAW 
have been met with renewed opposition from conservatives who glorify American 
exceptionalism and “women’s traditional roles as mothers, wives, and caregivers” 
(Ramdas 2011, 30). Ultimately, conservatives believe that eradicating gender 
roles threatens American family life not only for women but for everyone 
(Ramdas 2011, 30). These types of arguments against CEDAW are supported by 
religious right groups
9
, but opposition to CEDAW does not come solely from 
conservatives. Over the past few years, resistance to ratification of CEDAW has 
surfaced from liberals, some of whom “fear that signing CEDAW will be a 
symbolic gesture that would amount to sweeping the problem under the carpet 
instead of creating meaningful change for women in the [United States] who 
experience discrimination” (Ramdas 2011, 30-31). Unless the concerns of 
opposition groups from both political parties can be addressed, CEDAW will 
most likely remain in the CFR indefinitely and the United States will remain a 
non-party to the convention.  
 Having discussed some of the biggest sources of support and opposition to 
the treaty, this section now turns to a more in-depth look at the specific arguments 
made in favor of and in opposition to ratification. Starting with the latter, many 
opponents believed that ratifying CEDAW, and thus becoming accountable to the 
treaty’s monitoring committee, would undermine national sovereignty by 
requiring “the federal government or, worse, the United Nations to interfere in the 
private conduct of citizens,” and by promoting international law that “runs 
counter to [United States] values concerning home, family, and security” over 
American law (Blanchfield 2011, 1& 8; Wakefield 2010; Crouse 2002, 43; Merry 
2005, 80; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 15). Weakened 
American sovereignty matters to treaty opponents not simply from an ideological 
standpoint, but also from a practical stance because ratification of CEDAW would 
immediately subject the United States “to an evaluation of how well we comply 
with the treaty’s provisions” (Sommers 2011, 46).  
 Ratification of CEDAW and subsequent evaluation of United States laws 
would necessarily call into question the way the United States addresses 
conceptions of gender equality. For example, “the division of labor between men 
and women exemplifies [sex] discrimination by distinguishing the feminine 
private sphere of the family and the masculine public sphere of the market, 
politics, and the state” (Stopler 2005, 46). Even though women have achieved 
greater inclusion in the public sphere and in political theory over the years, 
discrimination against women is still accorded a troubling degree of legitimacy 
based on its connection to religious and cultural norms. In particular, the United 
States, and much of Western civilization in general, subscribes to the powerful 
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biblical myth of Adam and Eve, “which has defined the relationships between 
men and women on both the theoretical and the practical level for generations” 
(Stopler 2005, 48). Specifically, justification for women’s inferiority, especially 
in the Christian tradition, comes from “Eve’s responsibility for the fall of Adam, 
which was interpreted as the responsibility of all women to the advent of evil in 
the world. . . . In Christian thought, a woman’s role as a submissive wife and 
mother is not only her punishment, but also her only means of salvation” (Stopler 
2005, 48). Even in situations where these religious undertones carry less sway, the 
United States’ financial affluence, “the rigid requirements of the highly 
competitive job market, the social and cultural expectations from women and the 
gendered structure of the self, combine to keep many highly educated and 
professionally trained women at home with their children” (Stopler 2005, 75). As 
a result, the United States “has one of the lowest labor force participation rates for 
college educated women in the developed world” (Stopler 2005, 75). 
 Some treaty opponents also contest ratification on the basis that the United 
States does not need to ratify a convention with high costs when it already 
implements a “highly developed system of civil rights laws protecting women” 
(Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 40). This claim appears supported 
by the fact that “many countries widely believed to have poor women’s rights 
records ratified the Convention” and continue to follow discriminatory laws 
today, thus making CEDAW an involuntary façade for atrocities committed 
against women in the treaty’s member states (Blanchfield 2001, 9; Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 48). Consequently, many activist groups, 
NGOS, and legal scholars have voiced their concern that the treaty lacks adequate 
enforcement mechanisms for compliance and, as a result, that CEDAW “has not 
made any difference in eliminating discrimination against women” (Marry 2006, 
72; CFR 2002, 15). For example, China ratified CEDAW in 1980 but the 
government today still practices forced abortions and sterilizations to uphold its 
one-child population control policy (Lockwood 2006, 641; Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations 2002, 15). Similarly, states like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and 
North Korea “have done almost nothing to reform their laws, policies, and 
practices, even when admonished” by the international community (Sommers 
2011, 40). This hypocrisy goes virtually unchallenged for such states against 
whom the CEDAW committee cannot levy sanctions or fines, but treaty 
opponents in the United States argue that: 
 
By contrast, the United States takes its international treaty obligations 
seriously [and] if we ratified CEDAW, we would consider ourselves 
morally committed to abide by its rules [and] many of those rules are 
antithetical to American values, and any good-faith effort to incorporate 
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them into American law would conflict with our traditions of individual 
freedom (Sommers 2011, 40). 
 
In essence, the United States does not want to subject itself to standards that other 
countries appear to disregard without any international consequences, especially 
when those expectations run counter to traditional American values. Collectively, 
the arguments made against ratification of CEDAW have successfully stalled the 
treaty from gaining the support of a two-thirds majority in the Senate.  
With regard to the arguments made in favor of CEDAW, treaty proponents 
insist that ratification will not jeopardize American sovereignty. First, advocates 
contend that the actions and decisions of the CEDAW committee will not override 
domestic laws nor affect the private lives of American citizens because American 
laws already fall in line with the goals of the treaty and because neither the 
Convention nor the Committee have any “established rules for enforcing its 
recommendations or addressing treaty non-compliance” (Blanchfield 2011, 9; 
Koh 2002, 273). Second, ratifying CEDAW will allow the United States to 
nominate a representative to the monitoring committee, which would protect the 
United States from accusations of non-compliance as well as assist in the 
admonishment of other states that violate treaty provisions (Blanchfield 2011, 12; 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 21). Conversely, persisting in its 
current state of non-ratification, the United States simply cannot leverage the 
power of the Committee to call other nations to account for their compliance with 
the treaty (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 4). This power is 
particularly important in our post-9/11 world because the United States “cannot 
be a world leader in guaranteeing progress for women’s human rights, whether in 
Afghanistan, in the United States, or around the world, unless it is also a party to 
[CEDAW]” (Koh 2002, 264). Therefore, while acceding to CEDAW will not 
undermine American sovereignty, refusing to ratify the treaty surely weakens the 
United States’ international influence and reputation. 
  One particularly important matter of contention between treaty supporters 
and opponents is what sort of message United States ratification of CEDAW 
would send to the rest of the world. American influence internationally, without 
the threat or use of military force, rests heavily on the perceived reputation of the 
United States. Specifically, treaty proponents insist that the United States’ failure 
to ratify CEDAW signals American weakness and hypocrisy when we try to 
speak up for women’s rights in countries like India and Pakistan without being 
able to point to our signature on this women’s rights treaty (Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations 2002, 26 & 48). In fact, treaty supporters have testified that the 




Has reduced our global standing, damaged our diplomatic relations, and 
hindered our ability to lead in the international human rights community. 
Nations that are otherwise our allies, with strong rule-of-law traditions, 
histories, and political cultures, simply cannot understand why we have 
failed to take the obvious step of ratifying thing convention. In particular, 
our European and Latin American allies regularly question and criticize 
our isolation from this treaty framework both in public diplomatic settings 
and private diplomatic meetings (Koh 2002, 269). 
 
In particular, the United States “might be viewed as hypocritical because it 
expects countries to adhere to international standards that it does not itself follow” 
(Blanchfield 2011, 12). United States ratification of the treaty “would make an 
important global statement regarding the seriousness of our commitment on these 
issues [and] it would have a major impact on ensuring both the appearance and 
the reality that our national practices fully satisfy or exceed international 
standards” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 33). In essence, 
ratification will increase the credibility of actions taken by the United States to 
stop discrimination against women globally, which in turn will lend more 
credibility to America’s other foreign policy objectives (Blanchfield 2011, 11-12; 
Ramdas 2011, 34).  
CEDAW advocates also focus on the positive impact of ratification within 
the United States. Some feminist activists support ratification based on the belief 
that CEDAW would provide an opportunity “for American women to secure 
rights the Constitution has not delivered” (Sommers 2011, 42). In particular, 
liberal feminists argue that once women have equal access to succeed alongside 
men in the public sphere (economically, educationally, politically, and legally), 
“women will experience less discrimination and deprivation [and] these gains are 
expected to translate into a more equal treatment of women, including reducing 
their risk of victimization” (Martin et al 2006, 324). Specifically, because the 
United States Department of Justice has found that nearly three million women 
every year are physically abused by their husbands or boyfriends, ratification of 
the treaty “would send a signal to perpetrators and victims alike that the United 
States is serious about eliminating violence [against women] at home as well as 
abroad” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2002, 27).  
In assessing the collective reasons that have prevented the United States 
from ratifying CEDAW, it is important to conclude with the observation that 
current events can have just as great an impact on the path of a treaty as its 
domestic history. Specifically, the Senate’s failure to take any action on CEDAW 
during Obama’s presidency may be linked to the Senate’s recent rejection of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in December 2012. 
This surprising outcome, coupled with increasing partisanship in Washington, 
11 
 
indicates that CEDAW would face a steep uphill battle if Democrats attempt to 
push for a ratification vote during the remainder of Obama’s second term. 
Unfortunately for treaty advocates, the case of the CRPD mirrors the case of 
CEDAW in many ways, including the belief by many opponents, discussed in 
detail above, that the intentions of the treaty are admirable but the provisions for 
carrying out those goals are misguided and detrimental to vital American interests 
and the preservation of national sovereignty. In such a climate, CEDAW is 
unlikely to achieve ratification.  
 
Conclusion 
As revealed by the analysis above, the ratification process for CEDAW in the 
United States has been anything but straightforward and its chances of success 
remain uncertain. The strength of the largely Republican opposition has 
historically stalled consideration of the treaty and more recently effectively 
prevented the Senate from ratifying the treaty despite President Obama’s desire 
otherwise. The main areas of contention over ratification relate to the preservation 
of American sovereignty and the reputation of the United States in pursuing 
foreign policies it claims to support in theory but upon which it hesitates in 
practice. The United States’ reluctance to ratify CEDAW not only damages its 
international credibility and influence with regard to its own foreign policy 
actions, but it also threatens American security and sovereignty by emboldening 
other countries who face “little immediate pressure to implement and conform to 
the requirements of the convention” (Parpart et al. 2002, 64).  
American policymakers, interest groups, and the public generally support 
CEDAW’s goals of advancing women’s rights and eliminating gender 
discrimination, but disagreement over whether the treaty is an appropriate or 
effective mechanism for achieving these goals has been strong enough to derail all 
attempts at ratification thus far (Blanchfield 2011, 1 & 9). What makes the 
concerns over sovereignty so devastating for CEDAW is the way in which this 
content- and implementation-driven problem combines with the Senate’s 
obstruction procedures. If the Senate is structured with treaty opponents holding a 
majority, then the CFR Chairman can block a treaty and the Majority Leader can 
drum up votes along the party line in opposition to ratification. Thus, for CEDAW 
to receive Senate advice and consent to ratification, the President must actively 
campaign for its success, the CFR Chairman must be invested in seeing the treaty 
move forward in the ratification process, and the Senate at large must engage in 
bipartisan communication and compromise since neither party holds a 
supermajority. Ultimately, no matter what decision the United States makes with 
regard to the ratification of CEDAW, the choices of the Senate on this treaty will 
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